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NOTES
mit without incorporating any lengthy quotation or burden-
some digest of the pleadings, evidence, and proceedings."4
ROBERT E. IROSENWALD, '30.
JURISDICTION TO AWARD ALIMONY IN MISSOURI
WHERE DEFENDANT IS NOT PERSONALLY SERVED
In making awards for alimony courts are often faced with
difficult and peculiar problems. The deserted wife, attempts
of the husband to evade jurisdiction, the question of reaching
property left behind him-all these are factors which the court
must take into consideration. It is inevitable that occasional
conflicts should result between unbending statutory regulations
and the desire on the part of the court to distribute justice in
extreme cases.
Prior to the case of Chapman v. Chapman' there had been no
adjudication in Missouri of the question whether a deserted wife
may have her absconding husband's property within the juris-
diction of the court seized and appropriated to the payment of
alimony for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff. In
that case the plaintiff sued for divorce, also praying that a re-
ceiver be appointed to take charge of real estate alleged to be the
property of the absconding husband, and appropriate it to the
payment of alimony in gross in the form of a special lien against
the property. Plaintiff charged that her husband attempted
to convey the property to his brother in fraud of her rights, and
joined the brother as a defendant. Plaintiff had adequate
grounds for divorce. Service on both defendants was by publi-
cation. Both defaulted. The trial court granted plaintiff a
divorce, but declined to make any order touching the matter of
alimony and dismissed the "bill" as to the brother. The Court
of Appeals allowed the alimony, but the judgment of the trial
court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.2
The trial court, in holding itself without jurisdiction to render
any judgment for alimony without personal service on the hus-
band, reiterated the position taken by the courts of practically
all the states,sthe occasional exceptions being by virtue of statute.
4
See note 1, supra.
(1916), 194 Mo. A. 483, 185 S. W. 221.
'(1917), 269 Mo. 663, 192 S. W. 448.
For earlier Missouri cases to this effect, see Ellison v. Martin (1873), 53
Mo. 575; Hedrix v. Hedrix (1903), 103 Mo. A. 40, 77 S. W. 495; Elvins
v. Elvins (1913), 176 Mo. A., 1. c. 651, 159 S. W. 746, cases cited; Moss v.
Fitch (1908), 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475.
' The New York statute is typical, and will be considered later in detail.
Laws 1923, sec. 1171-a c. 51.
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Of course, the fundamental distinction between a suit for di-
vorce and a suit for alimony, as regards jurisdiction, lies in the
fact that the former is an action in rem, and the latter an action
in personam. In divorce proceedings the marriage status con-
stitutes the res, but a judgment for alimony is not ordinarily
regarded as an incident thereto, and so cannot be supported by
constructive service upon the husband. This is on the theory
that service by publication or personal service beyond the limits
of the state will not support a judgment in personam6
Considerations of public policy played a prominent part in
forming the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The court as-
serted that it is the settled policy of the state to enforce the
marital obligations; that courts should enforce this policy and
protect the wife so far as possible without violating express stat-
utes or overturning recognized legal principles. This court "does
not agree with the trial judge-that a judgment for alimony is
in the very nature of things, a personal judgment. The action
for divorce is sui generis. It deals with a status, one incident
of which is the husband's obligation to support and maintain
the wife."
That the Missouri Supreme Court did not look upon the in-
stant question as startling or revolutionary is shown in the
earlier case of Moss v. Fitch.6 Plaintiff brought suit for divorce
against her husband who was at the time in Wyoming, and he
was personally served with summons in that state, but not in
Missouri. It was held that the court had jurisdiction to enter
a decree granting the plaintiff a divorce, but no jurisdiction to
award her a general judgment for alimony even though he had
property in this state. "Substituted service or service by publi-
cation only gives the court jurisdiction over the res, which, in a
suit for divorce, without asking for a special judgment against
specially described property, is the divorce, the marital relation,
the status of the plaintiff in relation to the defendant." The
court thus intimated that if the proper foundation were laid in
the pleadings, it might have the power to subject property of the
absent spouse, within the jurisdiction, to the wife's claim for
alimony. Moss v. Fitch, however, upheld the "firmly established
rule in this state that no personal judgment can be had on pro-
cess of this state, executed outside of the state, or upon service
by publication."
'Statutes purporting to authorize the rendition of a personal judgment
against a non-resident defendant upon service either by publication or per-
sonal service beyond the territorial limits of the state have consequently
been held void. See Priest v. Capitain (1911), 236 Mo. 446, 139 S. W. 204;
Moss v. Fitch (1908), 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475; Wilson v. Railroad
(1891), 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286. * (1908), 212 Mo. 484, 111 S. W. 475.
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Suits for divorce and alimony are, strictly speaking, neither
in law nor in equity, since the Missouri legislature has estab-
lished the Court of Domestic Relations.7 However, in the Chap-
man case, the Missouri Supreme Court takes a definite position,
as expressed in these words: "While it may be true that in a
divorce case the court may be called on, incidentally, to decide
collateral questions of equity jurisprudence, yet in the light of
the facts as they are, we must hold that, in this state, the suit
for divorce and alimony is one at law and not in equity." It has
frequently been held that the jurisdiction of the courts in Mis-
souri to hear and determine suits for divorce and alimony de-
pends upon and is limited by statute.8 In adopting this view the
Missouri Supreme Court held it a mistake to say that the court
can require jurisdiction to render a judgment in rem as to
property within the state and subject it to alimony award of the
court if the proper foundation is laid by the pleadings and the
process. "The foundation must be laid deeper than the plead-
ings and process; it must be in the law."
Quite contrary to this view was the position taken by Judge
Holmes, while on the Massachusetts bench, in Blackington v.
Blackington. The wife sued her husband for separate mainte-
nance under statute, after he had deserted her. He was served
with notice in another state. In holding that the court had
jurisdiction, and could make an order which could be enforced
against the husband's property in Massachusetts, Judge Holmes
said: "The whole proceeding is for the regulation of a status.
The incidents of that status are various--some concerning the
support, of the petitioner or her child-. The status, con-
sidered as a whole, is subject to regulation here, although it in-
volves relations with another not here, because such regulation
is necessary rightly to order the daily life, and to secure the com-
fort and support of the party rightfully living within the juris-
diction." Though this opinion was approved by the Court of
Appeals in the Chapman case, the Missouri Supreme Court, in
refusing to grant the alimony, felt no hesitation in censuring
the decision and in refusing to follow its rule of policy. "The
judgment for alimony was upheld [in the Blackington case] on
the ground that such alimony was a part of the res, i. e., the
'Laws 1921, 225.
' Doyle v. Doyle (1858), 26 Mo. 545; McIntire v. McIntire (1883), 80 Mo.
470; State ex rel. v. Grimm (1912), 239 Mo. 340, 143 S. W. 483; McElvain
v. McElvain (1927), 221 Mo. A. 136, 296 S. W. 460, 463: "A suit for di-
vorce and all subsequent proceedings relative to the modification of the
original decree as recognized in this state, are purely statutory." Robin-
son v. Robinson (1916), 268 Mo. 703, 186 S. W. 1032; Klenk v. Klenk (Mo.
A. 1926), 282 S. W. 153, 157.
1 (1886), 141 Mass. 432, 5 N. E. 830.
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.status of the marriage relation, a proposition directly opposed
to the doctrin. of our Missouri cases, and of the almost unani-
mous rule of the courts of other states."
Admitting that it has been held frequently in Missouri that
no judgment for alimony can be rendered against a defendant
who is brought into court by constructive service, this does not
minimize the importance of the question as influenced by grounds
of public policy. Why should the deserted wife be precluded
from obtaining her alimony when the absconding husband leaves
property behind him within the jurisdiction of the court?
Earlier Missouri cases apparently give rise to the belief that
proceedings in rem could be successfully instituted against the
property.10 Our legal system recognizes that no sovereignty
can extend its powers beyond its own territorial limits to sub-
ject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Juris-
diction must be founded either upon the person of the defend-
ant being within the territory of the sovereign where the court
sits, or his property being within such territory; for otherwise
there can be no sovereignty exerted, upon the known maxim,
"Extra territorium jusdicenti impune non paretur."11 The
question here being considered was before the court in the early
case of Ellison v. Martin, 2 where the plaintiff sued her husband
for divorce and alimony. The service was by publication.
Judgment went for divorce and alimony, and under the judg-
ment for alimony an execution was issued and the land sold to
Ellison. The Supreme Court declared both the judgment and
deed void, because "a judgment on order of publication can only
be given in proceedings in rem." The court then distinguished
between divorce, in rem; and alimony, in personam. But the
real question was sidestepped in these words: "Whether prop-
erty can be brought before the court by describing it in the
petition and demanding a judgment in rem for alimony, is a
question we are not now called upon to decide. This judgment
was a general judgment in personam, and such judgments can-
not be rendered in this state merely on publication of notice."
Without disturbing the holding that actions for divorce and
alimony in Missouri are purely actions at law, it seems quite
feasible that existing statutes could be interpreted to give the
1 Smith v. McCutchen (1866), 38 Mo. 1. c. 417; Latimer v. R. R. (1868),
43 Mo. 1. c. 109: "The well-established and settled principle is, that to give
a court jurisdiction, a real defendant, against whom the plaintiff is en-
titled to a judgment, must be found and served with process within the
limits of the jurisdiction; or some property or chose in action of his must
be found there upon which the court can proceed in rem." Also see Ellison
v. Martin (1873), 53 Mo. 1. c. 578.
Story, CONFLICTS OF LAWS, sec. 539.
1 (1873), 53 Mo. 575.
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wife a right to alimony on constructive service. Our statute
with regard to alimony and maintenance 1 3 provides that when
the wife is the plaintiff the court may grant such alimony and
maintenance for the wife and children as shall be reasonable,
and "order the defendant to give security for such alimony and
maintenance," and should he neglect to give security, "may
award an execution for the collection thereof, or enforce the per-
formance of the judgment or order by sequestration of the prop-
erty, or by such other lawful ways and means as is according
to the practice of the court." The next section 14 provides that
when alimony is decreed in gross the decree shall be a general
lien upon the realty of the party against whom the decree is
rendered. However, in the fairly recent case of Watts v. Watts 5
it was held that "nothing in these sections can be construed to
give the court authority to divest the judgment defendant of
his title to real or personal property, and vest the same in plain-
tiff. 'Sequestration,' as used in that section of the statute,
means a setting apart of the property so that it may be subject
to execution and payment of the judgment. 6 Where decree of
divorce is awarded to the wife, the court is entirely without
jurisdiction to vest in her, as a part of her alimony, the title to
property real and personal owned by the husband." Several
prior Missouri cases were cited to support this interpretation.Y
The Supreme Court's feeling as expressed in the Chapman case
was that the writ of sequestration cannot issue until after the
judgment for alimony is rendered. "Prior to such judgment
the plaintiff is not entitled to any lien, nor to any lawful right,
claim or demand to or against the property described in the
petition. . . .The court is not authorized by the statute to make
any order or decree with reference to any specific property. It
can only render judgment for money as alimony." If we were
to submit to this proposition, that a judgment for alimony must,
in the nature of things, be a money judgment, and in order to
secure a money judgment there must be personal service, then,
" R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1806. ' R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1807.
" (1924), 804 Mo. 361, 263 S. W. 421.
"The following interesting comment appears in 38 A. L. R. 1084. "In
Chapman v. Chapman (1916), 269 Mo. 663, 192 S. W. 448, it was said that
sequestration was an equitable remedy, and since an action for divorce and
alimony was, by the law of Missouri, an action at law, it was doubtful
whether there was any vitality left in the statutory provision for seques-
tration in divorce proceedings, which provision had been retained, probably
by oversight, in the revision of the laws, in which the provision that a
suit for divorce should be an equitable one, and that the court should sit
therein as a court of chancery, was left out."
"Ecton v. Tomlinson (1919), 278 Mo. 282, 287-288, 212 S. W. 865; Aylor
v. Aylor (Mo. 1916), 186 S. W. 1068; Davidson v. Davidson (1907), 207
Mo. 702, 106 S. W. 1.
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in order to get divorce and alimony together we must concede
that there must be personal service.
Section 1196 of R. S. Mo., 1919, provides for constructive
service by publication "in suits of partition, divorce, attach-
ment, suits for the foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust,
and for the enforcement of mechanic's lien and all other liens
against either real or personal property, and in all actions in
law or in equity,' which have for their immediate object the en-
forcement or establishment of any lawful right, claim or demand
to or against any real or personal property within the juris-
diction of the court. The Court of Appeals in the Chapman case
interpreted this statute strongly in favor of the deserted wife.
"The suit is for divorce, and proceeds, too, upon the theory that
the wife, under the circumstances, has a just and lawfully en-
forceable claim or demand to or against the husband's real estate
described in the petition." But the Supreme Court, in re-
versing that decision said, "There is nothing in that section in
regard to the judgment for alimony which authorizes a proceed-
ing in rem against the property of the defendant. And this is
true whether the provision as to sequestration of property be
considered valid or void." Any attempt to determine the justice
or injustice of such a conclusion necessitates a consideration of
the resulting hardship to the wife and the advantage to the
delinquent husband. Should he be subjected to the provisions
of law applied to the ordinary debtor, or does he stand in a bet-
ter position? It is true, of course, that the judgment of the
ordinary creditor does not bind his debtor for contempt, as in
the case of a failure to meet stipulated provisions for alimony by
the husband. But though the usual way to enforce payment of
alimony is by contempt, under statute 8 the plaintiff may now
proceed by execution.
Other states have allowed the wife to recover her alimony by
actions in rem against property within the jurisdiction of the
court. In a suit for maintenance in California", the wife sought
to have fraudulent transfers of the non-resident husband's real
property, within the jurisdiction, set aside, and to have the same
subjected to the payment of the wife's claim. It was held the
trial court had jurisdiction to afford the relief sought, upon
service by publication. In an action for divorce and alimony
in Kansas,20 where, as in the Chapman case, constructive service
was had upon the non-resident husband, it was held: "The court
has no authority to render a judgment in personam without ob-
taining jurisdiction of the person of defendant. Here, how-
ever, land was brought within control of the court in what was
N. 13, above. 'Murray v. Murray (1896), 115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37.
'Mesner v. Obrien (1896), 56 Kan. 724, 728, 44 Pac. 1090, 1092.
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substantially a proceeding in rem. The complaining wife was
here; the land sought to be subjected to alimony was here."
Benner v. Benner was an action by the wife for alimony and
maintenance of a child in Ohio.2 1 The petition described the
real estate of the non-resident husband. There was a decree
for the plaintiff. "If the action may properly be regarded as
an action in rem, the court could undoubtedly obtain jurisdiction
by constructive service, to appropriate the property of the de-
fendant, situated in the county where the action was brought, to
the purposes of the action, though it could render no personal
judgment on which maintained." In the Benner case the court
relied upon a state statute. The theory on which these courts
proceed is that the state, through its tribunals, may subject
property situated within its limits, owned by non-residents, to
the payment of the demands of its own citizens against them.
Every state owes protection to its own citizens.22
The simplest way of solving the difficulties of the deserted
wife is, of course, by special statute similar to the one in effect
in New York.2 3  The case of Matthews v. Matthews24 illustrates
the practical benefit of such a statute. The ultimate holding
was that the court may be permitted, in an action against a non-
resident or concealed defendant in a divorce proceeding, where
substituted service of process is effected, to sequester his prop-
erty itself, if necessary, to the payment of alimony, counsel fees,
and the support of children. The effect of the New York
statute is this: Where in an action for divorce or separation,
the defendant is not within the state so he can be personally
served, the court may order his property sequestered, appoint a
receiver, and apply the income to the education and support of
the children, the support of the wife, and the expenses of the
suit. If the rents and profits are insufficient, the court may
direct a mortgage or sale of the property. The court may ap-
point the wife receiver or sequestrator. The phrase "In an
action," as interpreted by the New York Court in the Matthews
case, must refer to an action already pending or presently be-
gun. After he has been served by publication, and is irf default
of appearance or pleading, the court can enter judgment and dis-
pose of the sequestrated property as it deems best for the interest
of the wife and children. If the defendant appears, of course,
there is no difficulty.
Statutes of this character have been held valid whenever at-
tacked on constitutional grounds; at least, when provision is
made for notice to the defendant before any actual disposition
' (1900), 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N. E. 569.
See Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714, 723.
Laws 1923, sec. 1171-a c. 51. - (1925), 240 N. Y. 28, 147 N. E. 237.
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of the property is made. The courts seemingly take the view
that the effect of these statutes is practically the same as that
of statutes providing for ordinary attachment of an absent de-
fendant's property.25 Under the construction of the Matthews
case, supra, the effect of the statute is the same as though the
property were attached and held subject to further order of
court.
Whether the view taken by the Missouri courts up to the
present time is to be deemed correct or incorrect necessarily de-
pends on the view we take of the whole subject of divorce and
alimony. Neither divorce nor alimony is a matter of right, but
involves great discretion on the part of the court, particularly
with regard to alimony. Before making any award, the court
usually deems it incumbent upon itself to inquire into the amount
of the husband's income, the amount of property held by the
wife, the number of children, and into whose custody they are
given. Some courts, and perhaps a majority, are inclined to
regard alimony as an expression of the husband's continuous
obligation.of support, while other courts view it as a settlement
and division of the property held by the married couple. But it
is apparent that alimony is not a debt, and perhaps this is a
sufficient basis for distinguishing between the right of a credi-
tor to levy on property of his debtor without personal service,
and the corresponding lack of right in the wife as regards ali-
mony. Changes in conditions of living, however, necessarily
involve changes in the law. Where the wife has adequate
grounds for divorce, and in the opinion of the court has a de-
serving claim to alimony, it appears radically unjust to allow
the husband to evade all liability of support merely by removing
himself from the jurisdiction of the court. If the Missouri
Court feels that it cannot grant relief to the deserted wife under
any interpretation of existing Missouri statutes, and conse-
quently that property left by the husband within the jurisdic-
tion is immune to attack, there appears ample ground for remedy
by the legislature. As divorce is coming to be recognized more
and more as a necessity under existing conditions of society, it
seems that the husband should not have it within his power to
evade a just claim to alimony any more than he should be able
to evade a just claim for divorce. The importance of this state-
ment is emphasized when we consider that the wife may for-
ever be barred of alimony in those states which do not recognize
the right of the wife to institute a suit for alimony subsequent to
a decree of divorce. The New York statute is in keeping with
the times.
JOSEPH J. CHUSED, '30.
See annotation in 38 A. L. R. 1084.
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